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A novel RTL countermeasure intended to protect the AddRoundKey step of the AES algorithm against DPA or CPA attacks has been proposed and tested on an AES encoding coprocessor implemented on FPGA. Experimental results based on CPA attacks confirmed the effectiveness of the proposed countermeasure, showing that with 100000 acquired power curves, the absolute value of correlation function is one order...
The LSI design methodology against Differential Power Analysis (DPA) is important to realize a tamper-resistant cryptographic circuit. In order to verify the DPA resistance before ASIC fabrication, the DPA verification using FPGA is commonly used. However, power traces of ASIC differ from that of FPGA, so the DPA verification on FPGA cannot guarantee the DPA resistance on ASIC. On the other hand,...
In this paper, authors propose a new Second Order Differential Power Analysis (SO-DPA) countermeasure for AES cipher. While published results for SO-DPA are proposing multiple masking solutions and the design of two independent True Random Number Generator (TRNG), the proposed design in this paper uses only one TRNG and combines a simple masking solution with the Correlated Power Noise generator (CPNG)...
Electronics cryptographic devices can be attacked by monitoring physical characteristics released from their circuits, such as power consumption and electromagnetic emanation. These techniques are known as Side Channel Attacks (SCAs). The Differential Power Analysis (DPA) is one of the most effective SCAs, which can reveal the secret key from the dependency between power consumption of the device...
Security at low cost is an important factor for cryptographic hardware implementations. Unfortunately, the security of cryptographic implementations is threatened by Side Channel Analysis (SCA). SCA attempts to discover the secret key of a device by exploiting implementation characteristics and bypassing the algorithm's mathematical security. Differential Power Analysis (DPA) is a type of SCA, which...
To secure cryptography hardware implementation many works are focusing on side-channels attacks. For such attacks, several different countermeasures can be done at different levels abstraction. But all published countermeasures lead to a significant area and power consumption overhead. In this paper, we present a new countermeasure against DPA attack which also leads to very small implementation compared...
This paper presents FPGA implementation and overhead evaluation for an algorithmic DPA countermeasure for advanced encryption standard AES. To reduce implementation overhead the masked compact S-Box, proposed by Canright, was chosen to implement a DPA countermeasure on an SRAM FPGA. Obtained results showed that secured AES IP leads to slices number increase by 60,1% and a frequency decrease by 4%.
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