After the Referendum on Scottish Independence, Ed Milliband called for a constitutional convention on the shape of future devolution. Underpinning this call appeared to be the assumption that existing mechanisms for securing constitutional change were not able to ensure that the people were adequately represented. This paper examines legislative amendment of the Constitution and Popular referenda as existing mechanisms for constitutional change in the UK to try and establish the role they play in the UK Constitution and whether that assumption is true. It then goes on to examine the constitutional convention as a forum for securing change. It concludes that all of these mechanisms can be seen as legitimizing in some way, and that all can play a role in securing legitimate change, but that no one mechanism can guarantee the democratization and legitimization of a system. Both legitimacy and democracy are virtues which a system may enjoy to a greater or lesser extent but the way in which a system can be amended tells us a great deal about where the true sovereign lies in a given constitutional system.