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I prefer to think of Game theory as a set of tools to describe and analyze social interactive decision situations. This viewpoint leads to several important implications. First, game theory is neither a single theory nor a unified body of knowledge nor a single research program in the sense of Lakatos (1978). Rather it is a collection of a variety of subfields and approaches, each representing a possibly...
The main fundamental question in cooperative game theory is the question how to allocate the total generated wealth by the collective of all players—the player set N itself—over the different players in the game. In other words, what binding contract between the players in N has to be written? Various criteria have been developed.
So far we have focussed our discussion on the Core and related set theoretic solution concepts as concepts that address the fundamental problem of cooperative game theory—the identification of stable binding agreements between the participating players. As such these set theoretic solution concepts consist of allocations that satisfy some fundamental properties of negotiating power of coalitions and,...
In the previous chapters I investigated different solution concepts for cooperative games as descriptions of productive interactive situations. First, I considered the Core, which is a set of payoff vectors based on the bargaining power of various coalitions in the interactive situation. Next I considered single valued solution concepts with very powerful properties, resulting into value theory.
In this and the next chapter I discuss some applications of the cooperative game theoretic notions that were covered in the previous chapters. In this chapter I focus on the theory of directed networks. In general, a network is a list of binary relationships or links between pairs of individuals. There are multiple ways in which we can interpret such binary relationships. Here I address first the...
The goal of this chapter is to analyze the consequences of the implementation of a hierarchical authority structure on the set of players in the context of a cooperative game with transferable utilities. In this analysis it is assumed that an exogenously given authority structure is imposed and puts certain constraints on the behavior of the players in the game.
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