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The article focuses on the problem of truth in posterior works of Wittgenstein, especially in his essay 'On Certainty'. The main problem concerns the range of changes that presumably were introduced in the grammatical interpretation of the classical concept of truth, as it was developed by Wittgenstein in the thirties, and repeated in 'Philosophical Investigations'. The author argues that that these changes constitute an integral development of the conception of truth that Wittgenstein adopted previously. Accordingly, they cannot be construed as a new position of Wittgenstein who purportedly abandoned the classical conception of truth and espoused cognitive relativism.