The question of subject's cognitive access to his own mental states contains an assumption, that this cognition is direct and authoritative, what is also a condition of subject's self-knowledge. The directness means, that this kind of cognition is not burdened by the intermediaries as Fregean senses or representations. Now arises the problem, how the self-knowledge, which has a propositional character can be direct, hence nonrepresentational. In this paper the authoress considered the three kinds of representations, which are present in self-knowledge and she tried to answer the question, whether it is possible to preserve the directness of self-knowledge, despite of its representational constituents. First she asked about the representation of self, then she assumed that to have self-knowledge a subject has to conceptualise his state as a belief or other experience of a certain kind and he has to think about himself as a subject of this state. Then she considered the representation of the modality of the state. Finally she analysed the representational character of the content of mental states. The conclusion of these investigations was that even if the self-knowledge in its epistemological aspect is representational (for example because of its propositional structure) it preserves its directness in its essential form, i.e. psychological aspect.
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