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The problem of publishing privacy-guaranteed data for hypothesis testing is studied using the maximal leakage (ML) as a metric for privacy and the type-II error exponent as the utility metric. The optimal mechanism (random mapping) that maximizes utility for a bounded leakage guarantee is determined for the entire leakage range for binary datasets. For non-binary datasets, approximations in the high...
Binary hypothesis testing under the Neyman-Pearson formalism is a statistical inference framework for distinguishing data generated by two different source distributions. Privacy restrictions may require the curator of the data or the data respondents themselves to share data with the test only after applying a randomizing privacy mechanism. Using mutual information as the privacy metric and the relative...
This work presents strong data processing results for the power-constrained additive Gaussian channel. Explicit bounds on the amount of decrease of mutual information under convolution with Gaussian noise are shown. The analysis leverages the connection between information and estimation (I-MMSE) and the following estimation-theoretic result of independent interest. It is proved that any random variable...
We consider the problem of diluting common randomness from correlated observations by separated agents. This problem creates a new framework to study statistical privacy, in which a legitimate party, Alice, has access to a random variable X, whereas an attacker, Bob, has access to a random variable Y dependent on X drawn from a joint distribution pX,Y. Alice's goal is to produce a non-trivial function...
We investigate the problem of intentionally disclosing information about a set of measurement points X (useful information), while guaranteeing that little or no information is revealed about a private variable S (private information). Given that S and X are drawn from a finite set with joint distribution pS,X, we prove that a non-trivial amount of useful information can be disclosed while not disclosing...
The principal inertia components of the joint distribution of two random variables X and Y are inherently connected to how an observation of Y is statistically related to a hidden variable X. In this paper, we explore this connection within an information theoretic framework. We show that, under certain symmetry conditions, the principal inertia components play an important role in estimating one-bit...
Most practical security systems do not achieve perfect secrecy, i.e. the information observed by a computationally unbounded eavesdropper is not independent of the plaintext message. Nevertheless, there may still be properties of the plaintext that the eavesdropper cannot reliably infer. In this paper, we build on previous work by the authors and introduce new bounds that are used to quantify how...
Lower bounds for the average probability of error of estimating a hidden variable X given an observation of a correlated random variable Y, and Fano's inequality in particular, play a central role in information theory. In this paper, we present a lower bound for the average estimation error based on the marginal distribution of X and the principal inertias of the joint distribution matrix of X and...
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