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We formalize the definition of symmetric auctions to study fundamental properties of incentive compatible auction protocols. We characterize such auction protocols for those with a fixed number of items to sell and study some important properties of those with an indefinite number of sales.
This paper investigates a new auction model in which bidders have both copy and budget constraints. The new model has extensive and interesting applications in auctions of online ad-words, software licenses, etc. We consider the following problem: Suppose all the participators are rational, how to allocate the objects at what price so as to guarantee auctioneer’s high revenue, and how high it is....
Our research is motivated by finding auction protocols to elegantly coordinate the sellers and buyers when there are multiple auctions. In our model, there are multiple sellers selling different items that are substitute to each other, multiple buyers each demanding exactly one item, and a market that is monopolistic competitive. We implement our auction coordination protocol by polynomial running...
In this paper, we give the definition of randomized symmetric incentive compatible auctions. Then we define three monotone properties of such auctions and study the implication relationships among them. This paper extends our previous work [4] which was focused on deterministic symmetric incentive compatible auctions.
This paper investigates a new auction model in which bidders have both copy and budget constraints. This new model has extensive and interesting applications in auctions of online ad-words, software licenses, etc. We consider the following problem: Supposing all participators are rational, how does one allocate the objects and at what price so as to maximize the auctioneer’s revenue.We introduce new...
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