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The present paper characterizes equilibria of a generalized Volunteer’s Dilemma game, which is an integration of the Volunteer’s Dilemma and the step-level public goods games with binary decision. We also examined the explanatory power of widely accepted models with bounded rationality, the quantal response equilibrium (QRE) and level-k analysis. It is shown that the performance of the QRE model is...