Search results for: Tore Nilssen

Items from 1 to 19 out of 19 results

article

Delegating pollution permits*

Tapas Kundu, Tore Nilssen

The Scandinavian Journal of Economics > 124 > 2 > 457 - 487

We discuss the decision to delegate the regulation of pollution through sales of permits to a biased expert in a situation where the polluting firm has private information about its technology. We consider, in particular, constrained delegation where the government puts restrictions on the amount of pollution that the expert can sell permits for. We find that, in general, delegation is more likely...

article

Fatter or fitter? On rewarding and training in a contest

Derek J. Clark, Tore Nilssen

Economic Inquiry > 60 > 1 > 101 - 120

Competition between heterogeneous participants leads to low‐effort provision in contests. A principal can divide her fixed budget between skill‐enhancing training and the contest prize. Training can reduce heterogeneity, increasing effort. It also reduces the contest prize, making effort fall. We set up an incomplete‐information contest with heterogeneous players and show how this trade‐off is related...

article

Delegation of Regulation*

Tapas Kundu, Tore Nilssen

The Journal of Industrial Economics > 68 > 3 > 445 - 482

We discuss a government’s incentives to delegate regulation to bureaucrats. The government faces a trade‐off in its delegation decision: bureaucrats have knowledge of the firms in the industry that the government does not have, but at the same time, they have other preferences than the government. The preference bias and the private information interact to affect the incentives to delegate regulation...

article

Sweetening the Pill: a Theory of Waiting to Merge

Eileen Fumagalli, Tore Nilssen

Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade > 2019 > 19 > 3 > 351-388

Merger policy is a permission-granting activity by government in which there may be disincentives to seek permission because of the benefit from having other firms merge. We set up a sequential merger game with endogenized antitrust policy to study one aspect of these disincentives. In particular, we delineate a pill-sweetening motive for waiting to merge: a small firm may choose to let other bigger...

article

Erratum

Tore Nilssen

The Journal of Industrial Economics > 65 > 4 > 887 - 889

article

The Economics of Retailing Formats: Competition Versus Bargaining

Bjørn Olav Johansen, Tore Nilssen

The Journal of Industrial Economics > 64 > 1 > 109 - 134

We set up a merger game between retailing stores to study the incentives of independent stores to form a big store when some consumers have preferences for one‐stop shopping. Such one‐stop shopping creates complementarity between products, leading in turn to lower prices after a big store is formed but may also lead to an improvement in the bargaining position vis‐à‐vis producers through the creation...

article

Inter-firm price coordination in a two-sided market

Hans Jarle Kind, Tore Nilssen, Lars Sørgard

International Journal of Industrial Organization > 2016 > 44 > C > 101-112

In many two-sided markets we observe that there is a common distributor on one side of the market. One example is the TV industry, where TV channels choose advertising prices to maximize own profit and typically delegate determination of viewer prices to independent distributors. We show that in such a market structure the stronger the competition between the TV channels, the greater will joint profits...

article

Media competition enhances new-product entry: On the market for fake observations

Kjell Arne Brekke, Tore Nilssen

Information Economics and Policy > 2015 > 31 > Complete > 59-66

We show how increased competition in a media market may have implications for the competition between firms that are advertising in that medium. We apply a simple model of a product market with network externalities where firms buy advertising space in a media market and find that entry in the product market of a new and superior product is more likely, the more competitive the media market is. The...

article

Learning by doing in contests

Derek J. Clark, Tore Nilssen

Public Choice > 2013 > 156 > 1-2 > 329-343

We introduce learning by doing in a dynamic contest. Contestants compete in an early round and can use the experience gained to reduce effort cost in a subsequent contest. A contest designer can decide how much of the prize mass to distribute in the early contest and how much to leave for the later one in order to maximize total efforts. We show how this division affects effort at each stage, and...

article

Risk externalities in a payments oligopoly

Tore Nilssen

Portuguese Economic Journal > 2011 > 10 > 3 > 211-234

I discuss the role to be played by central banks in payment systems by way of an oligopoly model of a payments market where firms exert negative risk externalities upon each other. A central bank participating actively in this market is modelled as benign in two ways: exerting less externalities than other banks and maximizing welfare rather than profit. Because other banks react strategically to...

article

Health insurance: Medical treatment vs disability payment

Geir B. Asheim, Anne Wenche Emblem, Tore Nilssen

Research in Economics > 2010 > 64 > 3 > 137-145

We present arguments for treating health insurance and disability insurance in an integrated manner in economic analysis, based on a model where each individual’s utility depends on both consumption and health and her income depends on her earning ability. When purchasing insurance, she may choose a contract that offers less than full medical treatment. We find that high-ability individuals demand...

article

Genetic testing in competitive insurance markets with repulsion from chance: A welfare analysis

Michael Hoel, Tor Iversen, Tore Nilssen, Jon Vislie

Journal of Health Economics > 2006 > 25 > 5 > 847-860

A central theme in the international debate on genetic testing concerns the extent to which insurance companies should be allowed to use genetic information when offering insurance contracts. We provide a welfare analysis of this issue within a model of an insurance market with asymmetric information, having the following crucial feature: in addition to a state-contingent consumption profile, a person's...

article

Majority voting leads to unanimity

Geir B. Asheim, Carl Andreas Claussen, Tore Nilssen

International Journal of Game Theory > 2006 > 35 > 1 > 91-110

We consider a situation where society decides, through majority voting in a secret ballot, between the alternatives of ‘reform’ and ‘status quo’. Reform is assumed to create a minority of winners, while being efficient in the Kaldor–Hicks sense. We explore the consequences of allowing binding transfers between voters conditional on the chosen alternative. In particular, we establish conditions under...

article

Cream Skimming, Dregs Skimming, and Pooling: On the Dynamics of Competitive Screening

Diderik Lund, Tore Nilssen

THE GENEVA RISK AND INSURANCE REVIEW > 2004 > 29 > 1 > 23-41

We discuss the existence of a pooling equilibrium in a two-period model of an insurance market with asymmetric information. We solve the model numerically. We pay particular attention to the reasons for non-existence in cases where no pooling equilibrium exists. In addition to the phenomenon of cream skimming emphasized in earlier literature, we here point to the importance of the opposite: dregs...

article

Deductibles in Health Insurance: Pay or Pain?

Geir B. Asheim, Anne Wenche Emblem, Tore Nilssen

International Journal of Health Economics and Management > 2003 > 3 > 4 > 253-266

We study a health-insurance market where individuals are offered coverage against both medical expenditures and losses in income due to illness. Individuals vary in their level of innate ability and their probability of falling ill. If there is private information about the probability of illness and an individual's innate ability is sufficiently low, we find that competitive insurance contracts yield...

article

A public firm challenged by entry: duplication or diversity?

Tore Nilssen, Lars Sørgard

Regional Science and Urban Economics > 2002 > 32 > 2 > 259-274

Should a public firm locate close to, or far away from, a private firm, i.e. is duplication or diversity the optimum policy? We discuss a location game with exogenously fixed prices, in which consumers' transportation costs are asymmetric, in the sense that it is more costly for a consumer to move in one direction, say to the left, than it is to move to the right - a model particularly relevant in...

article

Sequential location when transportation costs are asymmetric

Tore Nilssen

Economics Letters > 1997 > 54 > 2 > 191-201

In this paper I study sequential location by three firms when it is more costly for a consumer to move in one direction, say to the left, than to move to the right. I provide a limit result for the case when the difference between left and right transportation costs approaches zero; this result resolves an equilibrium-selection problem in the case of symmetric transportation costs. I also discuss...

article

Insurance monopoly and renegotiation

Geir B. Asheim, Tore Nilssen

Economic Theory > 1997 > 9 > 2 > 341-354

Summary. The mechanism design problem of a monopoly insurerfaced with privately informed insureesis considered. It is assumed that the insurer cannot commit not to renegotiate (by using the information that customer separa-tion reveals) before contracts are put into force. A solution is offered by modeling renegotiation-proofness in a framework inspired by Greenbergs theory of social situations. Maximizing...

article

Non-discriminating renegotiation in a competitive insurance market

Geir B. Asheim, Tore Nilssen

European Economic Review > 1996 > 40 > 9 > 1717-1736

A variant of the Rothschild-Stiglitz model of a competitive insurance market is considered, where each uninformed firm is allowed to renegotiate the contracts that its customers initially sign, subject to the restriction that renegotiated contracts be offered to all the firm's customers. Such non-discriminating renegotiation is shown to weaken the profitability of cream skimming to the extent that...

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