The Infona portal uses cookies, i.e. strings of text saved by a browser on the user's device. The portal can access those files and use them to remember the user's data, such as their chosen settings (screen view, interface language, etc.), or their login data. By using the Infona portal the user accepts automatic saving and using this information for portal operation purposes. More information on the subject can be found in the Privacy Policy and Terms of Service. By closing this window the user confirms that they have read the information on cookie usage, and they accept the privacy policy and the way cookies are used by the portal. You can change the cookie settings in your browser.
We use the payment schedule based approach to ensure stable cooperation in multistage games with vector payoffs. On the example of the Shapley value in multicriteria game it is shown that the irrational behavior proof condition and the balance condition may be incompatible. We design a recurrent payment schedule that satisfies such advantageous properties as the efficiency condition, non-negativity...
To ensure sustainable cooperation in multistage games with vector payoffs we use the payment schedule based approach. The main dynamic properties of cooperative solutions used in single-criterion multistage games are extended to multicriteria games.We design two recurrent payment schedules that satisfy such advantageous properties as the efficiency and the time consistency conditions, non-negativity...
Set the date range to filter the displayed results. You can set a starting date, ending date or both. You can enter the dates manually or choose them from the calendar.