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While the properties of equilibria in games of interjurisdictional tax competition have been heavily scrutinized, no hard evidence is available that these equilibria exist. Even for the fundamental tax competition game introduced by Zodrow and Mieszkowski [J. Urban Econ. 19 (1986) 356] and Wildasin [J. Public Econ. 35 (1988) 229], only few positive, but arguably restrictive, results have been derived...