Wyniki wyszukiwania dla: B. Casas-Méndez

Pozycje od 1 do 10 spośród 10 wyników

artykuł

Implementing generating functions to obtain power indices with coalition configuration

J. Rodríguez-Veiga, G.I. Novoa-Flores, B. Casas-Méndez

Discrete Applied Mathematics > 2016 > 214 > C > 1-15

We consider the Banzhaf–Coleman and Owen power indices for weighted majority games modified by a coalition configuration. We present calculation algorithms of them that make use of the method of generating functions. We programmed the procedure in the open language R and it is illustrated by a real life example taken from social sciences. To finish, we generalize the algorithms to a wider class of...

artykuł

Computing Banzhaf–Coleman and Shapley–Shubik power indices with incompatible players

J.M. Alonso-Meijide, B. Casas-Méndez, M.G. Fiestras-Janeiro

Applied Mathematics and Computation > 2015 > 252 > Complete > 377-387

In this paper, we present methods to compute Banzhaf–Coleman and Shapley–Shubik power indices for weighted majority games when some players are incompatible. We use the so-called generating functions as a tool.

artykuł

Axiomatic of the Shapley value of a game with a priori unions

J. M. Alonso-Meijide, B. Casas-Méndez, A. M. González-Rueda, S. Lorenzo-Freire

TOP > 2014 > 22 > 2 > 749-770

In this paper, we define a modification of the Shapley value for the model of TU games with a priori unions. We provide two characterizations of this value and a new characterization of the Banzhaf–Owen coalitional value.

artykuł

The Deegan–Packel index for simple games with a priori unions

J. M. Alonso-Meijide, B. Casas-Méndez, M. G. Fiestras-Janeiro, M. J. Holler

Quality & Quantity > 2011 > 45 > 2 > 425-439

In this paper we define and axiomatically characterize an extension of the Deegan–Packel index for simple games with a priori unions. A real-world example illustrates this extension.

artykuł

Two variations of the Public Good Index for games with a priori unions

J. Alonso-Meijide, B. Casas-Méndez, M. Fiestras-Janeiro, M. Holler

Control and Cybernetics > 2010 > 39 > 3 > 839-855

artykuł

Two variations of the Public Good Index for games with a priori unions

J. M. Alonso-Meijide, B. Casas-Mendez, G. Fiestras-Janeiro, M. J. Holler

Control and Cybernetics > 2010 > Vol. 39, no 3 > 839-855

This paper introduces two variations of the Public Good Index (Holler, 1982) for games with a priori unions. The first one stresses the public good property which suggests that all members of a winning coalition derive equal power. The second variation follows earlier work on the integration of a priori unions (Owen, 1977 and 1982) and refers to essential subsets of an a priori union when allocating...

artykuł

Weighted multiple majority games with unions: Generating functions and applications to the European Union

J.M. Alonso-Meijide, J.M. Bilbao, B. Casas-Méndez, J.R. Fernández

European Journal of Operational Research > 2009 > 198 > 2 > 530-544

An a priori system of unions or coalition structure is a partition of a finite set of players into disjoint coalitions which have made a prior commitment to cooperate in playing a game. This paper provides “ready-to-apply” procedures based on generating functions that are easily implementable to compute coalitional power indices in weighted multiple majority games. As an application of the proposed...

artykuł

Computing power indices: Multilinear extensions and new characterizations

J.M. Alonso-Meijide, B. Casas-Méndez, M.J. Holler, S. Lorenzo-Freire

European Journal of Operational Research > 2008 > 188 > 2 > 540-554

Johnston [Johnston, R.J., 1978. On the measurement of power: some reactions to Laver. Environment and Planning A 10, 907–914], Deegan and Packel [Deegan, J., Packel, E.W., 1979. A new index of power for simple n-person games. International Journal of Game Theory 7, 113–123], and Holler [Holler, M.J., 1982. Forming coalitions and measuring voting power. Political Studies 30, 262–271] proposed three...

artykuł

A solution for bargaining problems with coalition structure

G. Bergantiños, B. Casas-Méndez, M.G. Fiestras-Janeiro, J.J. Vidal-Puga

Mathematical Social Sciences > 2007 > 54 > 1 > 35-58

In this paper we study the restriction, to the class of bargaining problems with coalition structure, of several values which have been proposed on the class of non-transferable utility games with coalition structure. We prove that all of them coincide with the solution independently studied in Chae and Heidhues [Chae, S., Heidhues, P., 2004. A group bargaining solution. Mathematical Social Sciences...

artykuł

Characterizations of the Deegan–Packel and Johnston power indices

S. Lorenzo-Freire, J.M. Alonso-Meijide, B. Casas-Méndez, M.G. Fiestras-Janeiro

European Journal of Operational Research > 2007 > 177 > 1 > 431-444

In this paper, we provide a new characterization of the Deegan–Packel power index, which uses a new monotonicity property, and two characterizations of the Johnston power index by employing some usual properties of the literature and two new transfer properties. Finally, a real-world numerical example taken from the political field illustrates the main differences between these two indices.

Opcje filtrowania

Data publikacji

Ustaw własny zakres dat

Słowa kluczowe

Zbiór danych

Elsevier (6)
Springer (2)
BazTech (1)
DML (1)

Czasopismo

European Journal of Operational Research (3)
Control and Cybernetics (2)
Applied Mathematics and Computation (1)
Discrete Applied Mathematics (1)
Mathematical Social Sciences (1)
Quality & Quantity (1)
TOP (1)

INFONA - portal komunikacji naukowej

Wyniki wyszukiwania dla: B. Casas-Méndez

Dodaj adresata

Anulowanie wysłania wiadomości

Czy na pewno chcesz anulować wysłanie wiadomości?

Wyślij wiadomość

Opcje filtrowania

Data publikacji

Ustawianie zakresu dat

Podaj zakres dat dla filtrowania wyświetlonych wyników. Możesz podać datę początkową, końcową lub obie daty. Daty możesz wpisać ręcznie lub wybrać za pomocą kalendarza.

Słowa kluczowe

Zbiór danych

Czasopismo

Zgłaszanie błędu / nadużycia

Nieudane wysłanie zgłoszenia

Ułatwienia dostępu