The Infona portal uses cookies, i.e. strings of text saved by a browser on the user's device. The portal can access those files and use them to remember the user's data, such as their chosen settings (screen view, interface language, etc.), or their login data. By using the Infona portal the user accepts automatic saving and using this information for portal operation purposes. More information on the subject can be found in the Privacy Policy and Terms of Service. By closing this window the user confirms that they have read the information on cookie usage, and they accept the privacy policy and the way cookies are used by the portal. You can change the cookie settings in your browser.
In this paper, we examine the effects of the cry‐wolf syndrome in a setting where a manufacturer hires a forecaster to make a recommendation on the capacity decision. In this context, we define cry wolf as a behavioral syndrome in which the manufacturer becomes less compliant with a forecaster's valuable recommendation after the forecaster's prior recommendation is known to be ex post nonoptimal....
In inter‐organizational knowledge sharing, the firms share sensitive organizational knowledge to jointly solve a problem. However, the knowledge sender may conceal knowledge and the knowledge receiver may misappropriate the knowledge received from the sender. We formalize this situation using the double moral hazard framework and develop Stackelberg game models for symmetric and asymmetric information...
In the context of two supply chains containing one manufacturer and one retailer, the problem of asymmetric cost information game between two supply chains was discussed under Bertrand competition framework. We find that on the one hand, as price sensitivity increases, the profit will increase first and then turn to decrease drastically; On the other hand, as intensity of price competition increases,...
This paper discusses competition decision issues between two supply chains, in which each one has one manufacturer selling a substitutable product through one retailer who faces a linear price-sensitive demand. We assume that there exists asymmetric cost information between the two supply chains, and that the two chains as well as two members in each chain follow the Stackelberg game setting. We analyze...
Set the date range to filter the displayed results. You can set a starting date, ending date or both. You can enter the dates manually or choose them from the calendar.