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True random number generators (TRNGs) are the basic building blocks of cryptographic implementations. They are used to generate random numbers required for security protocols, to generate ephemeral keys, and are often used in hiding or masking countermeasures to thwart implementation attacks. The protection of TRNGs is an important issue to guarantee the security of cryptographic systems but less...
Forcing faulty outputs of devices implementing cryptographic primitives in order to reveal some secret information is a well-known attack strategy. Tampering with the clock signal or the supply voltage are two popular techniques for generating erroneous behaviour. In this work we perform an in-depth analysis of the vulnerability of two different microcontroller platforms on clock and supply voltage...
Fault attacks have been widely studied in the past but most of the literature describes only individual fault-injection techniques such as power/clock glitches, EM pulses, optical inductions, or heating/cooling. In this work, we investigate combined fault attacks by performing clock-glitch attacks under the impact of heating. We performed practical experiments on an 8-bit AVR microcontroller which...
Security-relevant applications applying contactless communication technologies based on radio-frequency identification (RFID) need to be robust against side-channel analysis (SCA) attacks. This work compares two measurement approaches for evaluating the robustness of RFID devices against SCA attacks: Analogue demodulation and resolution optimization of the oscilloscope. Several distances for measuring...
The detectability of malicious circuitry on FPGAs with varying placement properties yet has to be investigated. The authors utilize a Xilinx Virtex-II Pro target platform in order to insert a sequential denial-of-service Trojan into an existing AES design by manipulating a Xilinx-specific, intermediate file format prior to the bitstream generation. Thereby, there is no need for an attacker to acquire...
A huge number of security-relevant systems nowadays use contactless smart cards. Such systems, like payment systems or access control systems, commonly use single-pass or mutual authentication protocols to proof the origin of the card holder. The application of relay attacks allows to circumvent this authentication process without needing to attack the implementation or protocol itself. Instead, the...
Evaluating the side-channel analysis (SCA) resistance of an implementation is often a challenging task for a chip designer. Reducing the time required for evaluation allows faster redesign cycles and lowers consequently also product costs. In this work we present several ways to speed up the evaluation of implementations of symmetric cryptographic primitives according to their resistance against SCA...
Today's society is used to get information of different types of items in a fast and convenient way using e.g., a camera or a barcode scanner in combination with the Internet. Using near-field communication (NFC) this information procurement can be further simplified. The desired information is obtained by just touching a so-called NFC tag with an NFC-capable device (e.g. smartphone). Of course also...
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