The paper is concerned with the fundamental dichotomies that organize the ways of investigations in today's philosophy of science: normative versus naturalized epistemology, context of justification versus context of discovery, rationality versus irrationality, theory versus experience. It is shown that these dichotomies are not sustainable. They result in inadequate, even false images of science.
Russo offers a concept of science that is anti-empirical according to his declarations. However, he permanently includes empirical elements in his models of natural sciences, and even of mathematics. A tension between empirical and non-empirical character of science in the Russo's model leads it to non-consistency and even to contradiction.
The so-called naturalization of epistemology (within the framework of a scientific theory) requires: (a) theoretically neutral and philosophically autonomous conceptual assumptions, (b) choosing conceptually and in respect to content changed laws of the theory, (c) transforming them - under a philosophically autonomous assumption - into relevant epistemological claims. All these three elements engage...
The program of naturalization of epistemology, which postulates the eliminative reduction of epistemology in science, cannot be realized. It ignores the very nature of epistemology. Naturalization of epistemology require philosophically autonomous elements drawn from the speculative knowledge.
Basically, the Grzegorczyk's concept of mentality, presented in his book 'Psychiczna osobliwosc czlowieka' (2003) ( Psychic Singularity of Man), stems from the culture of the culitvated higher social classes. The authoress considers critically this conception by showing that it is not acceptable on the descriptive level and seriously questionable on the normative one.
Barry Allen postulates that the unit of knowledge is artifact and rejects traditional idea that knowledge consists of true, justified beliefs. Analysis of Allen's concept of knowledge, being a restrictive form of pragmatism, shows that the epistemological change proposed by him is radical to a great degree. Allen neglects all important epistemological distinctions and categories. The concept is rooted...
Relationship between science and philosophy is analysed and the conclusions are mainly baased on Quine's and Lelas' conceptions of naturalising. It is argued that between the exclusion of science from philosophy and complete reduction of philosophy to science, there is a third possible way, of a dialogue character, taking science indirectly, selectively, and - after conceptual transformations - as...
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