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The use of safety cases in certification raises the question of assurance argument sufficiency and the issue of confidence (or uncertainty) in the argument’s claims. Some researchers propose to model confidence quantitatively and to calculate confidence in argument conclusions. We know of little evidence to suggest that any proposed technique would deliver trustworthy results when implemented by system...
This paper explores domain arguments—arguments about why techniques, processes, and designs possess properties as believed by their domain experts. An elicitation technique for their recovery from domain documents is presented. This is followed by demonstrated application of the technique to several domain artifacts from aviation engineering. The elicited arguments are presented and analyzed for their...
This paper documents a number of observations that may provide the basis for how User Requirements Notation (URN), currently the subject of ITU-T Z.150 and Z.151, can act as a modelling approach atop which normative guidance for architecture rationale or decision capture of System Safety and other concerns may be applied to Architecture Descriptions to act as an Assurance Justification. URN is thus...
An assurance case comprises evidence and argument showing how that evidence supports assurance claims (e.g., about safety or security). It is unsurprising that some computer scientists have proposed formalising assurance arguments: most associate formality with rigour. But while engineers can sometimes prove that source code refines a formal specification, it is not clear that formalisation will improve...
Common definitions of “safety case” emphasize that evidence is the basis of a safety argument, yet few widely referenced works explicitly define “evidence”. Their examples suggest that similar things can be regarded as evidence. But the category evidence seems to contain (1) processes for finding things out, (2) information resulting from such processes, and (3) relevant documents. Moreover, any item...
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