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Sale effort competition in dual channel supply chain happens among two manufacturers and one traditional retailer in e-commerce age. Being a channel leader the first manufacturer's role becomes complicated. That is, being the weaker traditional retailer's supplier and competing with the second weakest manufacturer on the internet at the same time. Focusing on sales effort, the paper finds out their...
Supply chain hybrid competition happens among two manufacturers and one traditional retailer in e-commerce age. Being a channel leader the first manufacturer's role becomes a little sophisticated. That is, being the traditional retailer's supplier and competing with the second weaker manufacturer on the internet at the same time. Besides, as an online competitor the second manufacturer's channel status...
In the context of a supplier and a retailer supply chain, the marketing efforts of the retailer have a significant impact on market demand. But due to the asymmetry of information, the supplier can not observe the behavior of retailer, and thus moral hazard may exist, which will affect the coordination of supply chain. Based on this, this paper analyzes the profit games between supplier and retailer...
We consider a supply chain in which there exist one national brand manufacturer and one retailer. Due to spatial consideration, the retailer is only allowed to sell the products under both brands up to a fixed quota. Thus, the quota allocation becomes an important issue for both brands which motivates our research. In this work, we investigate how the bargaining power in the supply chain affects the...
This paper analyzes the supply chains of traditional retailing and direct internet with one supplier and two Cournot competitive retailers. The noncoordination mechanisms which are Second-best Mechanism and Stackelberg Mechanism and one coordination mechanism which is Quantity Discount Mechanism are studied. We show that whether the supplier selects coordination mechanism will depend on concrete circumstance.
The coordination problem of a supply chain with one supplier and one retailer is analyzed under the condition that the cost information of the retailer is asymmetric. A revenue-sharing contract model is established, in the model, the supplier have the decision-making power of wholesale price and revenue sharing ratio, and the retailer have the decision-making power of hiding the information of marginal...
To stimulate consumers' purchase willingness, producers must determine the reasonable selling prices and warranty length for their product. Based on the diffusion mode, a dynamic Stacklberg game of price and warranty was researched in this paper. Through this model, we got some conclusion about the supplier and retailer's optimal strategy.
This paper discusses a cooperative game model on a three-stage supply chain composed of manufacturer, distributor and retailer, and puts forward a cooperative profit allocation tactics. The paper sets up three models for no enterprise cooperation, partial enterprises cooperation and all enterprises cooperation respectively. And get the profit of each alliance by backward induction. In the end, we...
In this paper we study only partial retailers to share information in a supply chain with retail and e-tail channels, which is composed of one manufacture and two retailers. To achieve maximum profits of manufacture, an incentive model is designed to motivate retailer information sharing by a price discrimination strategy in supply chain. Manufacture and retailerspsila optimization decision and profits...
Considering one manufacturer and two retailers in supply chain based on part of retailers to participate in information sharing, we use price discrimination strategy to design an incentive mechanism which motivates retailers to share uncertain demand information with manufacturer. The research results show that information sharing may be value-added to add their profits only in under certain conditions...
This paper builds up supply chain synergy marketing game model based on retailer investment level and manufactory investment level, applying the game theory to analyze the game methods of the manufactory and retailer under the different structure markets, It is discussed the related factor which different marketing mode influenced manufactory and retailer profits level, It is studied the synergy marketing...
This paper presents a three-stages game model between one manufacture and Yl retailers which engaged in Cournot competition. If the retailers share their forecasts truthfully, the manufacturer always benefits; however, the profits of the retailers always worse off by disclosing their demand information to the manufacturer. However, we show that the retailers have an incentive to understate their forecasts...
This paper studies the manufacturer's return policy and the retailers' decisions in a supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and two competing and risk-averse retailers under a single-period framework. The manufacturer sells her short-life-cycle products through two competing retailers, and the product demand is random and sensitive to the retailers' selling prices. We incorporate the risk measure...
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