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This paper aims to develop, for any cooperative game, a solution notion that enjoys stability and consists of a coalition structure and an associated payoff vector derived from the Shapley value. To this end, two concepts are combined: those of strong Nash equilibrium and Aumann–Drèze coalitional value. In particular, we are interested in conditions ensuring that the grand coalition is the best preference...
In this paper, we consider cooperative game with stochastic payoffs and give the definition of the Shapley value for it, which is obtained by extending the classical case. Then we provide explicit expression for the Shapley value of the cooperative game with stochastic payoffs, and discuss its existence and uniqueness. Finally, the properties of the Shapley value of convex cooperative game with stochastic...
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