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Agents' speculation behaviors are series problems which need to be solved. Through mathematical models and game theory, this paper analyzes optimal incentive contracts between principals and agents under asymmetric information condition in order to solve the problems in establishing incentive mechanism for agents. The relationship between incentive and risk is discussed and the best equilibrium between...
Project manager’s speculation behaviors can be relieved by monitoring or incentives. Through mathematical models and game theory, this paper analyzes the optimal incentive contracts between enterprises and their project managers under asymmetric information condition in order to solve the problems in establishing incentive mechanism for project managers. Supervision mechanism is introduced and analyzed...
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