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In this paper, we present the first biometric identity based signature (BIO-IBS) scheme that is fully secure in the standard model. We use biometric information as the identity and construct the user's public key by using a fuzzy extractor. A biometric reading provided by the alleged signer would be enough to verify the signature. The scheme was proven fully secure based on well-exploited q-Strong...
Ceremonies are a useful tool to establish trust in scenarios where protocols operate. They describe a greater range of issues not taken into account by protocol designers. We take an already-designed protocol and ceremony for a key management protocol operating in a Public-Key Infrastructure environment and test it using a formal method. The ceremonies were analysed to test human peerspsila cognition...
This article presents a formal IT-security model for the step-by-step exchange of digital items. Following the taxonomy of Asokan the model presented here addresses the security requirements for a so-called ldquoweakrdquo fair exchange. ldquoWeakrdquo refers to the fact, that third parties are used to dissolve disputes. In this model, non-repudiation proofs are used in an external dispute to establish...
Formal verification approaches can guarantee the correctness of security protocols. In this paper we take the well-known Needham-Schroeder public-key authentication protocol as an example, to show how we can apply the symbolic model checker for multiagent systems MCTK, which is developed by us, to the verification of security protocols. One temporal epistemic property is checked successfully both...
The Diffie and Hellman model of a Public Key Cryptosystem has received much attention as a way to provide secure network communication. In this paper, we show that the original Diffie and Hellman model does not guarantee security against other users in the system. It is shown how users, which are more powerful adversarys than the traditionally considered passive eavesdroppers, can decrypt other users...
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