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In some retail contexts, retailers can often stimulate product sales by offering a price discount or allocating more shelf or display space. The retailer's shelf-space and pricing decisions can affect not only the retailer's profitability but also the supplier's profitability. This paper investigates the impact of revenue sharing contracts on the retailer's shelf-space and pricing decisions. Consider...
In some retail contexts, displaying large quantities of inventory may stimulate demand. Manufacturers are therefore continuously battling for the retailer's limited shelf space. This paper models the impact of inventory subsidy contracts on the competition between manufacturers. Consider a supply chain with two competing manufacturers and their common retailer. The retailer's shelf-space-allocation...
By means of game theory, this paper analyzes the model of benefits allocation of supply chain which consists of a manufacture and a vendor and is dominated by the former. We discuss the preconditions of the model and give a simple and practical allocation method, gaining benefits not only according to contribution but also chain status.
A buyback contract between a upstream supplier and a downstream retailer in a two stages supply chain model with downside-risk control is designed and modeled, both of whom are risk-averse, and the retailer's risk aversion structure information is uncertainty for the supplier, who only have a prior probability distribution. The supplier's optimal contracts under full information and asymmetric information...
It is well known that retailers can often increase product sales by offering a price discount or allocating more shelf or display space. The retailer's shelf-space and pricing decisions affect not only the retailer's profitability but also the manufacturer's profitability. This research studies how a manufacturer can use revenue sharing contracts to influence the retailer's shelf-space and pricing...
In this paper we analyze a scenario where a buyer procures capacity from one or more suppliers in the presence of demand uncertainty. The buyer does not have information of suppliers?? production cost function but assumes it is sampled from a known probability distribution. The supplier, of course, has knowledge of its own cost function but like the buyer does not have information on other suppliers??...
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