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Functioning as an intermediary between tenants and cloud providers, cloud service brokerages (CSBs) can bring about great benefits to the cloud market. CSBs buy the cloud resources, i.e., servers, with lower prices from cloud providers and sell the resources to the tenants with higher prices. To maximize its own profit, a CSB may distribute tenants' requests to the clouds that waste energy resources...
In this paper we consider a mechanism design problem in the context of large-scale crowdsourcing markets such as Amazon's Mechanical Turk mturk, ClickWorker clickworker, CrowdFlower crowdflower. In these markets, there is a requester who wants to hire workers to accomplish some tasks. Each worker is assumed to give some utility to the requester on getting hired. Moreover each worker has a minimum...
In this paper, an approach on an auction-based pricing mechanism is proposed that can be modeled as a variant of reserve price biddings on combinatorial auctions. In there, the combinatorial auction is extended to cover multi-unit scenario, which allows bidding for indistinguishable items to cover the case, for example, to assign an allocation of aggregated electricity in a day, considering electricity...
We study online cloud resource auctions where users can arrive anytime and bid for heterogeneous types of virtual machines (VMs) assembled and provisioned on the fly. The proposed auction mechanism RSMOA, to the authors' knowledge, represents the first truthful online mechanism that timely responds to incoming users' demands and makes dynamic resource provisioning and allocation decisions, while guaranteeing...
In this paper, I discuss about a preliminary idea and its implementation of an auction-based dynamic electric power resource allocation framework that utilizes certain tractable pricing mechanisms, which can cover middle-scale smart grids, e.g., grids for manufacturing industries in a small city with several power suppliers. I illustrate how such an auction-based pricing mechanism can be modeled as...
We address the question of optimal proactive service and demand shaping for content distribution in data networks through smart pricing. We develop a proactive download scheme that utilizes the probabilistic predictability of the human demand by proactively serving potential users' future requests during the off-peak times. Thus, it smooths-out the network traffic and minimizes the time average cost...
We study pricing models for bandwidth sharing that do not depend on detailed statistical knowledge of network traffic. For a multiclass, processor sharing server, we show that three common pricing models, namely fixed rate pricing, Vickrey-Clarke-Groves pricing, and congestion-based pricing, are linked to the zeroth, first, and second moments, respectively, of the number of users in the system. We...
For Bayesian combinatorial auctions, we present a general framework for approximately reducing the mechanism design problem for multiple buyers to the mechanism design problem for each individual buyer. Our framework can be applied to any setting which roughly satisfies the following assumptions: (i) The buyer's types must be distributed independently (not necessarily identically). (ii) The objective...
We study the ITEM PRICING problem for revenue maximization in the limited supply setting, where a single seller with n distinct items caters to m buyers with unknown subadditive valuation functions who arrive in a sequence. The seller sets the prices on individual items. Each buyer buys a subset of yet unsold items that maximizes her utility. Our goal is to design pricing strategies that guarantee...
We consider markets in the classical Arrow-Debreu model. There are n agents and m goods. Each buyer has a concave utility function (of the bundle of goods he/she buys) and an initial bundle. At an ldquoequilibriumrdquo set of prices for goods, if each individual buyer separately ex-changes the initial bundle for an optimal bundle at the set prices, the market clears, i.e., all goods are exactly consumed...
In this paper, we introduce a pricing model that ensures efficient resource allocation that provides guaranteed quality of service while maximizing profit in multiservice networks. Specifically, a dynamic allocation policy is examined that relies on online measurements while each service class operates under a probabilistic bound delay constraint. We present a rigorous analysis of the properties of...
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