According to Brad Hooker's rule‐consequentialism, as well as ordinary moral prohibitions against lying, stealing, killing, and harming others, the optimific code will include an over‐riding “prevent disaster clause”. This paper explores two issues related to the disaster clause. The first issue is whether the disaster clause is vague—and whether this is a problem for rule‐consequentialism. I argue that on Hooker's rule‐consequentialism, there will be cases where it is indeterminate whether a given outcome counts as a disaster such that it is permissible to infringe a given prohibition to avoid that outcome. I argue that it counts in favour of Hooker's rule‐consequentialism that it makes this space for vagueness. The second issue is how to understand the disaster clause so that it does not make rule‐consequentialism intolerably demanding—and more particularly whether avoiding over‐demandingness requires the rule‐consequentialist to place a counterintuitive limit on requirements to aid. I will argue that rule‐consequentialism can avoid over‐demandingness without placing a counterintuitive limit on requirements to aid.