Influence models enable the modelling of the spread of ideas, opinions and behaviours in social networks. Bounded rationality in social networks suggests that players make non-optimum decisions due to the limitations of access to information. Based on the premise that adopting a state or an idea can be regarded as being ‘rational’, we propose an influence model based on the heterogeneous bounded rationality of players in a social network. We employ the quantal response equilibrium model to incorporate the bounded rationality in the context of social influence. We hypothesise that bounded rationality of following a seed or adopting the strategy of a seed is negatively proportional to the distance from that node, and it follows that closeness centrality is the appropriate measure to place influencers in a social network. We argue that this model can be used in scenarios where there are multiple types of influencers and varying pay-offs of adopting a state. We compare different seed placement mechanisms to compare and contrast the optimum method to minimise the existing social influence in a network when there are multiple and conflicting seeds. We ascertain that placing of opposing seeds according to a measure derived from a combination of the betweenness centrality values from the seeds, and the closeness centrality of the network provide the maximum negative influence. Further, we extend this model to a strategic decision-making scenario where each seed operates a strategy in a strategic game.