Conclusions
In stark contrast to the position of dominance it enjoyed at the height of the Apollo era-in what is best thought of as a single, unified space program-NASA’s role in the far more complex policy environment of the post-Apollo era is to serve as a sort of “broker” among all of the competing coalitions. This is also the case internal to NASA as its component offices align themselves with one coalition or another of them. The role of a “broker” for administrative agencies is to advocate more centrist positions than their interest-group allies.56 In NASA’s case, it may not always be clear what constitutes a “centrist position.” To begin with, some of the coalitions with which the Agency must deal can hardly be considered “allies.” Some members of the “business in space” group, for example, would be perfectly content if NASA was eliminated altogether.
Moreover, the requirements of most large-scale R & D programs-such as a permanent base on the Moon or human missions to Mars-can best be characterized as requiring a high level of resource commitment over decadelong time periods. These types of programs usually do not respond well to attempts at “brokering” between coalitions. However, NASA does make the attempt by developing commercial plans for human spaceflight (e.g., Space Shuttle privatization and ISS commercial development plan), by commissioning “studies” of Mars missions, and by demonstration projects of the component technologies needed to support Mars missions.57