Rational-choice corruptors are citizens who, under very particular circumstances, deem it perfectly justified to bribe government employees in order to expedite their transactions with the state. This analysis examines the effect of individual-level variables (direct contact with city employees, perception of corruption, the evaluation of the anti-corruption impetus of the administration in power, and trust in the judiciary), and country-level factors (red tape, democratic institutionalization, and judicial independence) on the likelihood of an individual being a rational choice corruptor. Using survey data and country-level statistics from 25 countries of the Americas, the ultimate goal is to uncover what exactly are the circumstances that give rise to this assessment regarding the justification of corrupt exchanges with the public sector. The study’s key finding is that individual experiences, perceptions, and beliefs explain better why some individuals become rational-choice corruptors than societal-level phenomena. The centrality of individual experiences with, and normative assessments of, public institutions to the fostering of this type of ‘rationality’ opens up important lines of inquiry for future research on corruption.