We cast doubts on the suggestion, recently made by Graham Priest, that glut theorists may express disagreement with the assertion of $$A$$ A by denying $$A$$ A . We show that, if denial is to serve as a means to express disagreement, it must be exclusive, in the sense of being correct only if what is denied is false only . Hence, it can’t be expressed in the glut theorist’s language, essentially for the same reasons why Boolean negation can’t be expressed in such a language either. We then turn to an alternative proposal, recently defended by Beall (in Analysis 73(3):438–445, 2013; Rev Symb Log, 2014), for expressing truth and falsity only , and hence disagreement. According to this, the exclusive semantic status of $$A$$ A , that $$A$$ A is either true or false only, can be conveyed by adding to one’s theory a shrieking rule of the form $$A \wedge \lnot A \vdash \bot $$ A ∧ ¬ A ⊢ ⊥ , where $$\bot $$ ⊥ entails triviality. We argue, however, that the proposal doesn’t work either. The upshot is that glut theorists face a dilemma: they can either express denial, or disagreement, but not both. Along the way, we offer a bilateral logic of exclusive denial for glut theorists—an extension of the logic commonly called $$\mathsf {LP}$$ LP .