Alternative forms of disciplining the actionsof senior enterprise managers can becharacterized as shareholder or stakeholdergovernance. This paper analyzes thecontingencies that favour different forms ofgovernance and addresses the question: doesRussia need a stakeholder-oriented model ofcorporate governance? The appropriateness ofdifferent governance regimes under variouscontingent situations are analyzed both ingeneral and with respect to Russia. We suggestthat contingent factors argue for theco-existence of two different governancemechanisms in Russia based on sectoraldifferences. Survey evidence is used to examinepatterns of Russian bank, employee and Statestakeholding behaviour and shows that, apartfrom managers, these stakeholders at present donot have a significant involvement indecision-making in the majority ofmanufacturing firms. Given institutionalweaknesses in Russia, a case may be made forthe State to have a role to play incounterbalancing dominant insider shareholdersand enforcing good corporate governanceprinciples.