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This paper establishes existence and uniqueness of Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) in a double auction. The concept of QRE has the intuitive property that a deviation from best response is less likely the higher the cost associated with the deviation itself. Thanks to such property, the QRE accommodates stochastic elements in the analysis of the strategic decision-making that arises in the double...
Ania (J Econ Behav Organ 65:472–488, 2008) shows that in the class of symmetric games with weak payoff externalities, symmetric Nash equilibria are equivalent to symmetric evolutionary equilibria (Schaffer in J Econ Behav Organ 12:29–45, 1989). We introduce a notion of a game with partial weak payoff externalities. We show that the class of games with partial weak payoff externalities includes most...
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