International Journal of Game Theory

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Values for strategic games in which players cooperate

Luisa Carpente, Balbina Casas-Méndez, Ignacio García-Jurado, Anne van den Nouwel

International Journal of Game Theory > 2005 > 33 > 3 > 397-419

In this paper we propose a new method to associate a coalitional game with each strategic game. The method is based on the lower value of finite two-player zero-sum games. We axiomatically characterize this new method, as well as the method that was described in Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). As an intermediate step, we provide axiomatic characterizations of the value and the lower value of matrix...

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A characterization of plurality-like rules based on non-manipulability, restricted efficiency, and anonymity

Biung-Ghi Ju

International Journal of Game Theory > 2005 > 33 > 3 > 335-354

A society needs to decide which issues (laws, public projects, public facilities, etc.) in an agenda to accept. The decision can be any subset of the agenda but must reflect the preferences of its members, which are assumed to be “separable weak orderings”. We characterize a family of plurality-like rules based on strategy-proofness, restricted efficiency, anonymity, and two weak axioms pertaining...

article

Multi-utilitarianism in two-agent quasilinear social choice

Christopher P. Chambers

International Journal of Game Theory > 2005 > 33 > 3 > 315-334

We introduce a new class of rules for resolving quasilinear social choice problems. These rules extend those of Green [9]. We call such rules multi-utilitarian rules. Each multi-utilitarian rule is associated with a probability measure over the set of weighted utilitarian rules, and is derived as the expectation of this probability. These rules are characterized by the axioms efficiency, translation invariance...

article

The Nash rationing problem

Marco Mariotti, Antonio Villar

International Journal of Game Theory > 2005 > 33 > 3 > 367-377

This paper studies the problem of allocating utility losses among n agents with cardinal non-comparable utility functions. This problem is referred to as the Nash rationing problem, as it can be regarded as the translation of the Nash bargaining problem to a rationing scenario. We show that there is no single-valued solution satisfying the obvious reformulation of Nash’s axioms, nor a multivalued...

article

The Böhm–Bawerk horse market: a cooperative analysis

Marina Núñez, Carles Rafels

International Journal of Game Theory > 2005 > 33 > 3 > 421-430

Single–valued solutions for the case of two-sided market games without product differentiation, also known as Böhm–Bawerk horse market games, are analyzed. The nucleolus is proved to coincide with the τ value, and is thus the midpoint of the core. The Shapley value is in the core only if the game is a square glove market, and in this case also coincides with the two aforementioned solutions.

article

Constitutional implementation of social choice correspondences

Bezalel Peleg, Hans Peters, Ton Storcken

International Journal of Game Theory > 2005 > 33 > 3 > 381-396

A game form constitutionally implements a social choice correspondence if it implements it in Nash equilibrium and, moreover, the associated effectivity functions coincide. This paper presents necessary and sufficient conditions for a unanimous social choice correspondence to be constitutionally implementable, and sufficient and almost necessary conditions for an arbitrary (but surjective) social...

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Strongly essential coalitions and the nucleolus of peer group games

Rodica Brânzei, Tamás Solymosi, Stef Tijs

International Journal of Game Theory > 2005 > 33 > 3 > 447-460

Most of the known efficient algorithms designed to compute the nucleolus for special classes of balanced games are based on two facts: (i) in any balanced game, the coalitions which actually determine the nucleolus are essential; and (ii) all essential coalitions in any of the games in the class belong to a prespecified collection of size polynomial in the number of players. We consider a subclass...

article

Farsighted Stability in an n-Person Prisoner’s Dilemma

Akihiro Suzuki, Shigeo Muto

International Journal of Game Theory > 2005 > 33 > 3 > 431-445

Farsighted stability is examined in an n-person prisoner’s dilemma. It is shown that any individually rational and Pareto efficient outcome is a farsighted stable set and no other farsighted stable set exists; it is further shown that the largest consistent set consists of all individually rational outcomes.

article

An axiomatization of the consistent non-transferable utility value

Sergiu Hart

International Journal of Game Theory > 2005 > 33 > 3 > 355-366

The Maschler–Owen consistent value for non-transferable utility games is axiomatized, by means of a marginality axiom.

article

On Stef Tijs

International Journal of Game Theory > 2005 > 33 > 3 > 379-380

INFONA - science communication portal

International Journal of Game Theory

Values for strategic games in which players cooperate

A characterization of plurality-like rules based on non-manipulability, restricted efficiency, and anonymity

Multi-utilitarianism in two-agent quasilinear social choice

The Nash rationing problem

The Böhm–Bawerk horse market: a cooperative analysis

Constitutional implementation of social choice correspondences

Strongly essential coalitions and the nucleolus of peer group games

Farsighted Stability in an n-Person Prisoner’s Dilemma

An axiomatization of the consistent non-transferable utility value

On Stef Tijs

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