This paper proposes a new solution for maintenance scheduling in deregulated power market by applying an independent market for maintenance scheduling based on game theory. Maintenance scheduling is one of the main issues in restructured power electricity markets, because each generation company desires to maximize its own payoffs and ISO has its own reliability and security concerns that mostly, these two points of view conflict with each other. The paper presents a dynamic maintenance market (MM) simulation based on dynamic game theory for resolving maintenance scheduling problem in deregulated market. In this market, GENCOs set their strategies in participating in wholesale power electricity market or maintenance market by considering load uncertainty, price forecasting and strategy of other GENCOs. On the other hand, ISO manages the maintenance market relying on reliability concerns and offering incentives or disincentives for GENCOs. This paper presents the ISO behaviors by using Monte Carlo Method for reliability indices computation based on load uncertainty and interactions with GENCOs. Numerical results are determined by applying Roy Billinton test system (RBTS) & IEEE reliability test system for testing accuracy and applicability of the new presented solution.