Two seminal but unconnected relevance theories of communication are compared: one found in Alfred Schutz's philosophy, and one developed by Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson in a cognitive-science framework. The comparison is meant to strengthen both sides by integrating their advantages, and to prompt further discussion between these and other relevance accounts. Both theories, it is argued, aim to grasp and explain the fact, unaccounted for by code-like rules (e.g. of language), that people interact in context in a routine yet flexible way. Both investigate a dynamics of selectivity in experience making certain selections ‘relevant’ to an individual, which interactants exploit for coordination. Three differences between the theories are examined, and specific integrations encouraged: (a) The central problematic of inter-individual ascriptions of relevance remains underdeveloped with Sperber/Wilson. Schutz's idea of ongoing ‘typification’ is proposed as an amendment. (b) Schutz lacks a concise notion of relevance. Sperber/Wilson's two-sided concept paves the way for a different concept meeting requirements identified in the article and captures the interlocking of routine and flexibility in interaction. (c) Sperber/Wilson overly restrict the range of experience powering their theory. This is shown for individual goals, whose inclusion via the recommended concepts of typification and relevance is suggested.