The development of international measures of football hooliganism control has been proceed-ing along several paths and included a number of different aspects of broadly understood con-trol over the phenomenon. One can define 4 periods differing in the football hooliganism con-trol paradigms applied: the first period - stretching from 1960s to 1985, second - between 1985 and 1997, third - 1997 to 2000 and fourth - from 2000 up to the present day. Consider-ing the issue of situational prevention of football hooliganism, control measures could be divided into two groups, or levels. The first level was mostly concerned with 'hard' means, i.e. such based on activities that rendered breaking the law or upsetting the public order more challenging. This was done with simple techniques of isolating opposing groups of supporters from each other by police cordons, fencing out sections of stadiums, putting up barriers, or 'cages' for visiting fans. Other popular 'hard' means aimed at increasing the perpetrator's risk of being subject to negative consequences, which mostly meant intensified police presence at a stadium. The progression to level 2 control was triggered by results brought by research on crowd management techniques conducted after the 2000 European Championship. The new trend involved gradual balancing out the 'hard' and 'soft' means, the latter having the purpose of limiting provocation and excuses (promoting the atmosphere of a joyful festival at football events, avoiding 'arming' and confrontation by security personnel, employment of surveillance and emergency services, etc.). A comparison of the ways in which football hooliganism situational prevention devel-oped with the integrated model of situational crime prevention brings an interesting insight into the effectiveness of the new situational trend, which is a method broadly employed in Western Europe to counter football hooliganism. According to R. Wortley, while the notion of opportunity reduction assumes that there already is an offender who is motivated or at least ambivalent and ready to commit a crime, the fact is that motivation to commit a crime may occur as a result of particular situational factors. Wortley defined 4 types of factors motivating a perpetrator to commit a crime, or the so-called precipitators: prompts, pressures, permissibility, and provocations. The integrated concept of situational prevention discussed in the article is a merger of the traditional methods of limiting crime opportunities, or the so-called 'hard' means, with a complementary set of techniques minimizing other situational factors proposed by R. Wortley, i.e. 'soft' means. D.B. Cornish and R.V. Clarke proposed a combination of the two approaches, which resulted in vastly broadened array of situational crime prevention techniques. The authors define 3 per-fect offender types: an offender pre-motivated to commit a crime, an ambivalent one (i.e. ready to commit a crime in certain circumstances) and one that would break law only when provoked. They suggest that the new, 'soft' situational prevention techniques are most useful in relation to individuals whose 'readiness' to commit a crime is, in a sense, temporary, i.e. in the last two types of the aforementioned offender types. Some doubts, however, arise as to the claim that the effective solution to be implemented in all three cases is control of moti-vational factors. It would seem that the new techniques of situational prevention cannot be used in a pre-motivated offender, who is ready to commit a crime and is only looking for a good occasion to do so. It is such doubts, valuable at the practical implementation level, that should be considered when referring to the integrated concept of situational prevention in the context of solutions adopted in Poland. For Poland, hosting Euro 2012 was a turning point in football hooliganism control is-sue – it was based on level 2 control measures as recommended by EU, i.e. with predominant use of 'soft' means. However, the preliminary condition to implement the measures is setting such situational arrangement that would be avoided by a motivated offender, or such situa-tional arrangement in which a motivated offender would avoid involvement in football hooli-ganism, which translates into effective control of criminal opportunity. It must be noted, though, that when 'hard' means are adopted - such as increasing the perceived risk of law-infringement consequences, increasing the effort necessary to break the law and limiting the potential payoffs - the same mistakes are made repeatedly, even if appropriate normative changes have been introduced. The aforementioned integrated concept of situational crime prevention proposed by R.V.G. Clarke and R. Wortley emphasises the importance of proper adaptation of different management techniques to different types of offenders and defines potentially negative consequences of wrong choices. The football hooliganism problem, due to the fact that the definition is incessantly formulated and extended, is not an issue of solely one type of crime: i.e. a contact crime, or involving only one type of offender. The term covers an array of infringements, and the perpetrators are not always pre-motivated offenders, not only 'spur-of-the-moment' ones or provoked ones acting on different motivations - but in variable proportions, it is all of them. This is even illustrated in the classification adopted by police, who group supporters in three categories: A – low risk supporters, B – medium risk supporters, C – high risk supporters. Control over law-breaking motivation factors, taking the form of 'soft' means, seems more appropriate in case of supporters in category A, and to some extent, category B, too. In turn, traditional situational prevention techniques, consisting in control over crime opportunity, prove more effective in countering football hooliganism when the offenders are motivated - thus falling in group C. The problem they posed was successful-ly dealt with in many European stadiums thanks to consequent application of the traditional situational prevention techniques, combined with surveillance and stadium bans. It was only after the hools issue was sufficiently dealt with, that the risk related to other groups of offenders was considered. In Poland, however, control over crime opportunity still has some flaws. Despite that fact, 'soft' means are being implemented. Such chaotic approach causes harm to safety, rather than improves it. This is generally true for stadiums where the expensive technological and infrastructural modifications are still a thing of distant future.