This paper interprets certain methodological and epistemological issues raised by Einstein. Part one reflects on the issue of evaluation criteria of the logical simplicity of the axiomatic systems that represent physical theories. Part two treats the issues related to the method of constructing axiomatic systems that represent physical theories. The Carnap's method of constructing the above systems is opposed to the method proposed by Einstein. Part three is devoted to the issue of the nature of the relation between theory and experience. Six aspects that decide about the relationship between theory and experience in Einstein's approach are itemized. These aspects are then analyzed from the model theory perspective. In the last part, the author analyzes the cognitive status of axiomatic systems that represent physical theories, i.e., confronts the thesis of instrumentalism with the thesis of epistemological realism that has been defined by Einstein. Finally, the analysis of solipsism issue, connected indirectly with the reality-instrumentality dispute is presented.
Financed by the National Centre for Research and Development under grant No. SP/I/1/77065/10 by the strategic scientific research and experimental development program:
SYNAT - “Interdisciplinary System for Interactive Scientific and Scientific-Technical Information”.