The Infona portal uses cookies, i.e. strings of text saved by a browser on the user's device. The portal can access those files and use them to remember the user's data, such as their chosen settings (screen view, interface language, etc.), or their login data. By using the Infona portal the user accepts automatic saving and using this information for portal operation purposes. More information on the subject can be found in the Privacy Policy and Terms of Service. By closing this window the user confirms that they have read the information on cookie usage, and they accept the privacy policy and the way cookies are used by the portal. You can change the cookie settings in your browser.
This article explores a three‐party contracting problem when the patient and the provider possess private information that is unobservable to the insurer. We show that for an insurance mechanism to be collusion‐proof, it suffices for the insurer to rely on the incentive for one side of the patient‐provider coalition. If the risk premium for the patient is smaller than the provider's informational...
Although healthcare provider payments have been studied extensively in the literature, little is known about the optimal compensation rule when, in addition to unobservable provider effort (moral hazard), the provider's ability type is also private information (adverse selection). We find that when only provider effort is unobservable, to induce the first‐best outcome the optimal compensation rule...
Set the date range to filter the displayed results. You can set a starting date, ending date or both. You can enter the dates manually or choose them from the calendar.