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In a multilateral bargaining game where a proposer and responders can set up a “principal–agent” relationship by means of binding cash-offer contracts, we show that there is a Markov SPE with a delay in reaching an agreement. We also show that all the individually rational and efficient payoffs can be supported by SPE.
We offer a definition of iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies (IESDS * ) for games with (in)finite players, (non)compact strategy sets, and (dis)continuous payoff functions. IESDS * is always a well-defined order independent procedure that can be used to solve Nash equilibrium in dominance-solvable games. We characterize IESDS * by means of a “stability” criterion,...
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