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This paper revisits the claim that supermajority rules and bicameral legislative structures restrain excessive government spending and taxation. Our analysis suggests that the extension effect of a supermajority rule—that requires logrolling across additional members—increases with the ratio of seats in the House relative to seats in the Senate. Using a panel of US states, 1970–2008, we find that...
This paper investigates the impact of a supermajority rule on the law of 1/n, which posits that a larger number of districts increases the size of government. Our analysis suggests that supermajority rule, despite the claim that it restrains excessive spending, increases the 1/n effect, because qualified majorities require logrolling to attract additional members. Using data from US states from 1970...
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