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Recently, due to the increase of outsourcing in IC design and manufacturing, it has been reported that malicious third-party IC vendors often insert hardware Trojans into their products. Especially in IC design step, it is strongly required to detect hardware Trojans because malicious third-party vendors can easily insert hardware Trojans in their products. In this paper, we propose a machine-learning-based...
In this paper, we propose a logic-testing based HT detection and classification method utilizing steady state learning. We first observe that HTs are hidden while applying random test patterns in a short time but most of them can be activated in a very long-term random circuit operation. Hence it is very natural that we learn steady signal-transition states of every suspicious Trojan net in a netlist...
Recently, due to the increase of outsourcing in IC design, it has been reported that malicious third-party vendors often insert hardware Trojans into their ICs. How to detect them is a strong concern in IC design process. The features of hardware-Trojan infected nets (or Trojan nets) in ICs often differ from those of normal nets. To classify all the nets in netlists designed by third-party vendors...
This paper proposes a redesign technique which designs from untrusted netlists to trusted netlists. Our approach consists of two phases, detection phase and invalidation phase. The detection phase picks up suspicious hardware Trojans (HTs) by pattern matching. The invalidation phase modifies the suspicious HTs in order not to activate them. In the invalidation phase, three invalidation techniques...
Recently, we face a serious risk that malicious third-party vendors can very easily insert hardware Trojans into their IC products but it is very difficult to analyze huge and complex ICs. In this paper, we propose a hardware-Trojan classification method to identify hardware-Trojan infected nets (or Trojan nets) using a support vector machine (SVM). Firstly, we extract the five hardware-Trojan features...
Due to the fact that we do not know who will create hardware Trojans (HTs), and when and where they would be inserted, it is very difficult to correctly and completely detect all the real HTs in untrusted ICs, and thus it is desired to incorporate in-situ HT invalidating functions into untrusted ICs as a countermeasure against HTs. This paper proposes an in-situ Trojan authentication technique for...
Recently, digital ICs are often designed by outside vendors to reduce design costs in semiconductor industry, which may introduce severe risks that malicious attackers implement Hardware Trojans (HTs) on them. Since IC design phase generates only a single design result, an RT-level or gate-level netlist for example, we cannot assume an HT-free netlist or a Golden netlist and then it is too difficult...
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