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The paper by Ghosh and Saha (Econ Theory 30:575–586, 2007) shows that entry can be socially excessive even if there are no scale economies. We show that exogenous cost asymmetry is responsible for this result. In a simple model with R&D investment by the more cost efficient firm, thus creating endogenous cost asymmetry, we show that entry is socially insufficient instead of excessive if the slope...
We show the effect of patent protection on R&D investment in the presence of ‘inventing around’ (or ‘non-infringing’ imitation) and technology licensing. Though the ‘tournament effect’ under patent protection may reduce R&D investment, we show that the effect of either imitation or technology licensing may always dominate the tournament effect and create higher R&D investment under patent...
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