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This paper proposes new necessary and sufficient conditions for secure implementation. Our result says that especially in certain environments including matching environments, restricted monotonicity alone is necessary and sufficient for secure implementation. Our application of the result to a school choice environment demonstrates that secure implementability of the deferred acceptance rule depends...
This paper studies secure implementation [Saijo, T., Sjöström, T., Yamato, T., 2007. Secure implementation. Theoretical Economics 2, 203–229] in economies with indivisible objects and money. We establish that on any minimally rich domain that is proposed in our paper, only constant social choice functions are securely implementable.
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