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Abstract. This paper explores the extent to which majority rule is invulnerable to manipulation by individuals and coalitions, even when majority rule is used to select more than one alternative. The resulting rule may or may not be strategy-proof, depending on the size of the coalitions that can form, and on the nature of the individual preferences over sets of alternatives. No individual can manipulate...
Summary. Assuming an odd number of voters, E. S. Maskin recently provided a characterization of majority rule based on full transitivity. This paper characterizes majority rule with a set of axioms that includes two of Maskins, dispenses with another, and contains weak versions of his other two axioms. It allows the number of voters to be odd or even.
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