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Nearly all global economic trade flows through the ports and a broader intermodal transit system in which supporting technology networks are often privately owned and operated. The majority of government oversight and industry cooperation focuses on physical access and the safe construction and operation of ships. The cybersecurity of critical maritime and interconnected infrastructure remains largely...
Traditionally, the focus of security and ensuring confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data in spacecraft systems has been on the ground segment and the uplink/downlink components. Although these are the most obvious attack vectors, potential security risks against the satellite's platform is also a serious concern. This paper discusses a notional satellite architecture and explores security...
Attribution in cyberspace is one of the most difficult questions facing policy makers, lawyers, and jurists. Indeed, the first question often asked in the wake of a cyber incident is “who did it?” The answer to this question is often critical when dealing with the application of international law because it will dictate the rights and responsibilities of States both from an offensive and defensive...
Presents the introductory welcome message from the conference proceedings. May include the conference officers' congratulations to all involved with the conference event and publication of the proceedings record.
The global use of the cyber domain has heightened speed, agility, and interconnectivity within our societies. Consequently, it has also increased threats that share the same characteristics. No longer is reality linear, as two points in time and individuals can connect from varied locations almost instantly, shifting the balance of how we approach traditional security challenges. This paper argues...
With cyber on NATO's agenda since 2002 and cyberspace declared a domain of operations for the Alliance at its 2016 Summit, one can ask a straightforward question — how will the Alliance make this declaration work? Starting from defining cyber operations to establishing procedures and delivering practical capability, much needs to be discussed amongst the NATO nations. In a predictable security environment...
This paper addresses contract and fiscal limitations in the acquisition process often seen as a constraint on real-time cyber capability development. First, the paper advocates for increased use of Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funds for low-cost cyber capability development. Using the Air Force's Real Time Operations and Innovation model, the paper suggests a near-term solution for other services...
The Air Force is shifting its cybersecurity paradigm from an information technology (IT)-centric toward a mission oriented approach. Instead of focusing on how to defend its IT infrastructure, it seeks to provide mission assurance by defending mission relevant cyber terrain enabling mission execution in a contested environment. In order to actively defend a mission in cyberspace, efforts must be taken...
This paper demonstrates a methodology for how the organizations that employ complex enterprise systems of systems can significantly improve cyber defense while decreasing overall operating costs by using formal methods. The paper demonstrates an approach that uses an event-based methodology to formalize all types of enterprise behavior, to include system, human, and environmental events.
The current realities of the cyber domain could be radically disrupted by the advent of quantum communications and quantum computing. The consequent challenges for future cyber security and strategy require a nuanced analysis of these technologies and their likely employment by major powers. The employment of quantum cryptography can create quantum communications systems that are theoretically unhackable...
The number of software vulnerabilities discovered and publicly disclosed is increasing every year; however, only a small fraction of them is exploited in real-world attacks. With limitations on time and skilled resources, organizations often look at ways to identify threatened vulnerabilities for patch prioritization. In this paper, we present an exploit prediction model that predicts whether a vulnerability...
Deterrence is badly needed in the cyber domain but it is hard to be achieved. Why is conventional deterrence not working effectively in the cyber domain? What specific characteristics should be considered when deterrence strategies are developed in this man-made domain? These are the questions that this paper intends to address. The research conducted helps to reveal what cyber deterrence can do and...
Since the 1970s, the United States has integrated technology into combat platforms to maintain its military superiority. Modern digital vulnerabilities within these platforms place U.S. capabilities and military forces at risk for cyber attack. This paper discusses the impact of digital vulnerabilities for operational commanders through the lens of joint functions and operational factors. The undisciplined...
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