A dynamic population model is proposed for the study of keyword auctions run on search engines. In this model bidders decide to join or leave the auction, depending on the results of the previous auction round. Through the use of a simulation scenario, we show that the model converges to a steady state quite fast, and
Keyword auctions are being used to sell the positions along the side of organic results shown by search engine when user types a keyword or a query related to keyword in a search engine. It has been a huge revenue generating arena for search engines since last decade. Irrespective of the great success of these types
Strategic bidding coupled with the GSP pricing mechanism is known to lead to aggressive bidding behaviour and Competitor Busting in keyword auctions. We introduce a new pricing mechanism, named Penalized Second Pricing (PSP), to help reducing the unfair effects of aggressive bidding.The performances of GSP and PSP are
the registered bidders. Given (1) the valuation of the advertisers competing for sponsored slots corresponding to a keyword, and (2) relevant click-through rates, the proposed algorithm generates a bid profile that can be input to a standard generalized second price based sponsored search auction mechanism. The bid
Financed by the National Centre for Research and Development under grant No. SP/I/1/77065/10 by the strategic scientific research and experimental development program:
SYNAT - “Interdisciplinary System for Interactive Scientific and Scientific-Technical Information”.