# Search results

Journal of Philosophical Logic > 2019 > 48 > 1 > 155-188

Journal of Philosophical Logic > 2019 > 48 > 2 > 305-405

Philosophical Studies > 2019 > 176 > 4 > 1035-1054

*contra*the current revenge-theoretic wisdom, that they can constitute genuine expressive limitations. I consider the anti-revenge...

Logic and Logical Philosophy > 2017 > 26 > 4 > 563–581

Studia Logica > 2018 > 106 > 1 > 101-130

Journal of Philosophical Logic > 2018 > 47 > 2 > 227-257

*The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 56*, 1–49, 1991) formulated in classical logic, and (a variant of)...

Journal of Philosophical Logic > 2016 > 45 > 1 > 65-72

*modus ponens*”, Zardini presents some brief considerations against an approach to semantic paradoxes that rejects the transitivity of entailment. The problem with the approach is, according to Zardini, that the failure of a meta-inference closely resembling

*modus ponens*clashes both with the logical idea of

*modus ponens*as a valid inference and the semantic idea of the conditional...

Journal of Philosophical Logic > 2015 > 44 > 5 > 551-571

Annals of Pure and Applied Logic > 2012 > 163 > 10 > 1437-1445

Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu > 2012 > 19 > 4 > 488 – 505

Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu > 2011 > 18 > 1 > 40-61