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Some Notes on Boolos’ Semantics: Genesis, Ontological Quests and Model-Theoretic Equivalence to Standard Semantics

Francesco Maria Ferrari

Axiomathes > 2018 > 28 > 2 > 125-154

The main aim of this work is to evaluate whether Boolos’ semantics for second-order languages is model-theoretically equivalent to standard model-theoretic semantics. Such an equivalence result is, actually, directly proved in the “Appendix”. I argue that Boolos’ intent in developing such a semantics is not to avoid set-theoretic notions in favor of pluralities. It is, rather, to prevent that predicates,...

article

Somehow Things Do Not Relate: On the Interpretation of Polyadic Second-Order Logic

Marcus Rossberg

Journal of Philosophical Logic > 2015 > 44 > 3 > 341-350

Boolos has suggested a plural interpretation of second-order logic for two purposes: (i) to escape Quine’s allegation that second-order logic is set theory in disguise, and (ii) to avoid the paradoxes arising if the second-order variables are given a set-theoretic interpretation in second-order set theory. Since the plural interpretation accounts only for monadic second-order logic, Rayo and Yablo...

article

Plural quantifiers: a modal interpretation

Rafal Urbaniak

Synthese > 2014 > 191 > 7 > 1605-1626

One of the standard views on plural quantification is that its use commits one to the existence of abstract objects–sets. On this view claims like ‘some logicians admire only each other’ involve ineliminable quantification over subsets of a salient domain. The main motivation for this view is that plural quantification has to be given some sort of semantics, and among the two main candidates—substitutional...

article

Models, Models, and Models

Gregory Wheeler

Metaphilosophy > 44 > 3 > 293 - 300

Michael Dummett famously maintained that analytic philosophy was simply philosophy that followed Frege in treating the philosophy of language as the basis for all other philosophy (1978, 441). But one important insight to emerge from computer science is how difficult it is to animate the linguistic artifacts that the analysis of thought produces. Yet, modeling the effects of thought requires a new...

article

Why the Hardest Logic Puzzle Ever Cannot Be Solved in Less than Three Questions

Gregory Wheeler, Pedro Barahona

Journal of Philosophical Logic > 2012 > 41 > 2 > 493-503

Rabern and Rabern (Analysis 68:105–112 2) and Uzquiano (Analysis 70:39–44 4) have each presented increasingly harder versions of ‘the hardest logic puzzle ever’ (Boolos The Harvard Review of Philosophy 6:62–65 1), and each has provided a two-question solution to his predecessor’s puzzle. But Uzquiano’s puzzle is different from the original and different from Rabern and Rabern’s in at least one important...

article

LOGICISM AND PARADOX II.

V. Kolman

Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu > 2005 > 12 > 2 > 121-140

This is a sequel to my article devoted to the development of Fregean logicism. The first part dealt with its 'rise and fall', i. e. its initial success in analyzing the concept of number and its subsequent fall at Russell's antinomy. In the course of the previous article we did not (have to) leave the area of the classical Fregean research. On the contrary, Russell's paradox and its analysis bring...

article

Some Thoughts about the Hardest Logic Puzzle Ever

Tim S. Roberts

Journal of Philosophical Logic > 2001 > 30 > 6 > 609-612

“The Hardest Logic Puzzle Ever” was first described by the late George Boolos in the Spring 1996 issue of the Harvard Review of Philosophy. Although not dissimilar in appearance from many other simpler puzzles involving gods (or tribesmen) who always tell the truth or always lie, this puzzle has several features that make the solution far from trivial. This paper examines the puzzle and describes...

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Search results

Some Notes on Boolos’ Semantics: Genesis, Ontological Quests and Model-Theoretic Equivalence to Standard Semantics

Somehow Things Do Not Relate: On the Interpretation of Polyadic Second-Order Logic

Plural quantifiers: a modal interpretation

Models, Models, and Models

Why the Hardest Logic Puzzle Ever Cannot Be Solved in Less than Three Questions

LOGICISM AND PARADOX II.

Some Thoughts about the Hardest Logic Puzzle Ever

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INFONA - science communication portal

Search results

Some Notes on Boolos’ Semantics: Genesis, Ontological Quests and Model-Theoretic Equivalence to Standard Semantics

Somehow Things Do Not Relate: On the Interpretation of Polyadic Second-Order Logic

Plural quantifiers: a modal interpretation

Models, Models, and Models

Why the Hardest Logic Puzzle Ever Cannot Be Solved in Less than Three Questions

LOGICISM AND PARADOX II.

Some Thoughts about the Hardest Logic Puzzle Ever

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