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We study the role of partisan committee members in an information aggregation setup à la Feddersen and Pesendorfer. Based on their analysis we show that interest groups may impose a huge welfare loss on society because their activities distort political outcomes more than would be needed in order to achieve their own objectives. In an information acquisition framework à la Mukhopadhaya/Persico we...
This paper analyzes the impact of legislative committee structure on policy outcomes, comparing a `tax committee' (enacting tax expenditures) and a decentralized system of specialized committees (undertaking direct spending). An endogenous commodity taxation framework is combined with models of legislative bargaining and committee voting. The main conclusion is that the tax committee structure gives...
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