The MQV protocol of Law, Menezes, Qu, Slinas and Vanstone has been regarded as the most efficient authenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol, and standardized by many organizations including the US NSA. In Crypto 2005, Hugo Krawczyk showed vulnerabilities of MQV to several attacks and suggested a hashed variant of MQV, called HMQV, which provides the same superb performance of MQV and provable security in the random oracle model. In this paper we suggest an efficient authenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol providing the same functionalities and security of HMQV without random oracles. There exist some provably secure key exchange schemes using signatures in the standard model, but all of the schemes do not provide the same level of security of HMQV. So far there are no authenticated Diffie-Hellman protocols which are proven secure in the standard model and achieve the same level of security goals of HMQV efficiently yet. Dispensing of random oracles in our protocol does not require any expensive signature and encryption schemes.