The traditional approach for managing the fisheries is the acquiring of property rights over the fishery through legislation by the state. The state than parcels out rights and establishes rules (regulations) of use for the fishers. The state regulates the resource. The conventional literature in resource economics provide some insights into how common property resources such as fisheries, can be managed in a sustainable manner. Common property regimes, such as collective resource management systems, develop when a group of individuals are highly dependent on a resource (s) and when the availability of the resource (s) is uncertain or limited. There is a need to empirically evaluate the nature of the transaction costs involved in fisheries co-management institutions as a basis for defending a move away from the more centralised form of fisheries management institutions. The discussion presented in this paper will serve as a basis for further operationalization of the categories of transaction costs and for empirical case study analysis.
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