The purpose of the paper is to discuss ideas expressed in two recent papers published by J. Stelmach and B. Brożek. Contrary to the views of J. Stelmach and B. Brożek, it is argued that contemporary legal positivism cannot be defined by referring to methods by which legal questions are solved. Legal positivism is defined exclusively by separation thesis and social sources thesis, and not by any normative theory of interpretation. Legal positivism as a descriptive and general theory of law does not entail any legal methods. It is argued that the picture of logical, formal-dogmatic, normative and analytical methods pre sented by J. Stelmach and B. Brozek is inadequate. Therefore, the critique of positivism presented by J. Stelmach and B. Brożek is not heard and the myths of positivistic methods identified by them do not exist.
