The Concept of Independence of Central Bank on the Example of the National Bank of Poland

The need for independence of a central bank results from the fiduciary nature of modern money. Independence of the central bank is generally understood as depriving the executives of the influence on the bank's decisions, while depriving the legislative authority of the right to interfere in the pursued monetary policy. The most important areas of freedom are financial, functional and institutional independence. The results of independence studies of the National Bank of Poland (the NBP) quoted in the article show that the level of the NBP independence is high, often close to or equal to the maximum values for given measures. However, it should be noted that these studies relate to the formal (legal) independence of the NBP, and not the real one, because independence guaranteed by legal provisions does not necessarily correspond to the actual independence of the central bank. The legal regulations shape the conditions of actions of monetary authorities, while the final result of these actions depends on the individuals who perform them.